Estimating the effects of personal income tax on labour supply in Italy by D. Tondani
Keywords: Labour supply, Personal income taxation, Italy 






ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX ON 







University of Parma 
 Department of  Economics 
 Via Kennedy, 6  
 43100 Parma – Italy.  









A partire dal WP 3/2006 i Working Papers della Serie "Economia e Politica Economica" 
sono sottoposti alla valutazione di un referee anonimo 







In this paper we attempt to estimate labour supply elasticities for four 
categories of Italian workers: married men, married women, unmarried men, 
unmarried women. We use microdata provided by the Bank of Italy 2002 
survey adopting a piecewise linear labour supply functional form. Sample 
selection and tobit technique have been used. Wage elasticities are 
calculated from the results of the labour supply estimation. Hours of work 
are found to be positively related to after tax labour income and negatively 
related to virtual income. Female labour supply is more sensitive than that 









  2 1. Introduction
∗ 
OECD statistics shows that in Italy, in  2004, every worker worked a mean 
of 1,585 hours, against 1,824 hours in the US, 1,669 in the United Kingdom, 
that is two countries with an incidence of taxes lower than Italy. Economic 
theory usually attributes the low labour supply and labour force 
participation to the joint effect of high marginal tax rates and social security 
systems. For instance, Prescott (2004) argues that the large differences 
between  U.S. labour supply and those of Germany and France are due to 
difference in tax systems. But on the other hand, countries with high 
taxation also show a number of hours worked higher than or equal to Italy: 
for instance Finland (1,736 hours worked) or Sweden (1,585).
1  This factor 
lead to think that other variables may affect labour supply. For instance, 
Alesina et al. (2005), examine the role played by trade unions: they find that 
impact of taxes on labour supply disappears if the model control for 
unionisation or labour market regulation.  
Moreover, Italy currently shows one of the lowest labour force participation 
rate in the EU. Overall Italian employment rate in the age class 15-64 was 
57.6 per cent in 2004, against 63 per cent in EU-25. The female 
employment rate is 45.2 (55 per cent in EU-25). The activity rate in Italy is 
also smaller than the European average: 62.7 per cent in the age class 15-64, 
                                                 
∗ I would like to thank Pawel Strawiňski and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Obviously 
I bear full responsibility for any remaining errors. 
1 Data Source: OECD (2006). 
  3 against 69.7 per cent (EU-25) and 70.6 per cent (EU-15). For women the 
percentage is 50.6 against 62.0 and 62.6 per cent respectively.
2  
These figures indicates that even if it is undoubted that labour supply does 
respond to taxes and social security system, it is also important to observe 
the nature of the labour supply response. Eissa and Hoynes (2005), 
investigating the relationship between the American Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) and labour supply, find that the program encourage the 
employment (especially that of categories such as single parents, especially 
mothers) but reduces the hours worked by those already in the labour force. 
In other words, labour supply responses are concentrated along the entry 
margin  as well as along the intensive (hours worked) margin. 
Moreover, it is undoubted that personal and family characteristics affect the 
personal decision to supply labour. Married women, tend to be more 
sensitive to policy changes, regularly varying their decisions of participation 
in the labour market or hours worked. On the other side, males seem to be 
less sensitive to changes in the tax-benefit structure, adopting the behaviour 
of the traditional “male bread winner”. 
Empirical analysis of labour supply has been a intensive area of research in 
the last decades, both in United States and in Europe. If before the ‘80s the 
prevailing judgements was that taxation was not a serious disincentive to 
work decision, later academic research changes this opinion. In this sense, a 
                                                 
2 Eurostat, Labour Force Survey and Quarterly Labour Force Survey; Reported in European 
Commission (2005). 
  4 fundamental role has been played by the seminal paper of Hausman (1981). 
Several surveys reported the main techniques and results of the empirical 
investigations on labour supply, such as Blundell (1988, 1992), Blundell and 
Macurdy (1999), Atkinson and Mogensen (1993). 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the determinants of labour supply for 
Italian women and men. We use microdata provided by Bank of Italy 2002 
survey and adopting a piecewise linear labour supply functional form. 
Sample selection and Tobit technique have been used. In this analysis 
demand constraints are ignored. It is therefore assumed that if a person 
chooses to offer more time on labour market, he is able to do so. Endogenity 
problems are accounted for using an estimate of real wages instead of 
reported wages. 
Few researches recently treated this issue.  
Colombino and Del Boca (1990) estimated a neoclassical household labour 
supply model for married individuals, incorporating the main elements of 
the tax system, using a 1979 survey of couples living in Turin. They found 
that the labour supply of married women is elastic with respect to wage and 
income variation, while for married men the labour supply is inelastic with 
respect to variation in both. They estimate a wage elasticity of 0.54 and an 
income elasticity of –0.22 for married women. 
Aaberge et al. (1999) apply an econometric framework which allows for 
complex non convex budget sets, highly non-linear labour supply curves 
and imperfect markets with institutional constraints. Using 1987 Bank of 
Italy microdata they find that male labour supply is fairly inelastic while the 
  5 labour supply among females is considerable more elastic. The wage 
coefficients yelded by their analysis are 0.007 (conditional) and 0.053 
(unconditional) for men and 0.078 and 0.737 for women. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main 
characteristics of the model estimated. Section 3 describes the data used. 
The tax system is depicted in section 4. Section 5 shows the results and 
section 6 concludes. 
2. Theory 
A neoclassical labour supply model is here considered. Let’s consider an 
individual whose utility function depends on consumption ( ) C  and hours of 
leisure . The same individual has a budget constraint  () L
) ( ) (
1
I R E L T w Q P i
N
i
i − + − = ∑
=
 (1) 
where Pi are the prices and Qi the quantities of each of the N goods, w is the 
hourly wage rate, E are the gains from non-work activities, T-L is the 
number of hours worked and  is the tax paid on the taxable income I. 
We assume that all the individual take others household members’ labour 
supply decision as given in making their own decisions. Hence, gains from 
non-work activities are set as the sum of all the labour and non-labour 
income of the rest of the household plus unearned personal income. 
) (I R
In the absence of savings, the left-hand side of the equation (1) is equal to 
the total income of the consumer, Y. Defining the hours worked as 
L T H − =  the preference function becomes: 
) ( . . ) , ( I R wH E Y t s Y H U Max − + =  (2) 
  6 In a progressive tax system, we define R(I) as a piecewise linear function of 
taxable income: 
) ( ) ( ) ( n n n I I t I R I R − + =  (3) 
n is the index of the tax bracket that the individual faces according to her 
taxable income I, tn is the tax rate associated with the tax bracket n, and In is 
the lower taxable income limit for bracket n. 
Taxable income differs from gross income because of the value of tax 
exemptions (D): 
D E wH I − + =  (4) 
Substituting (3) and (4) in the budget constraint (2) we get: 
[ ] ) ( ) 1 )( ( n n n n n I R I t D t t E wH Y − + + − + =  (5) 
That is the linearized budget constraint for bracket n. 
Splitting the first member of the right-hand side of (5), it is observable that 
individual behaviour in terms of H and C is equivalent to that which arises 
from utility maximization under a linear budget constraint with a relative 
price of leisure (the uncompensated substitution effect) equal to 
and a “virtual income” (the income effect) measured by 
. 
) 1 ( n t w −
) 1 ( n E t − [] ) ( n n n n I R I t D t − + +
For an individual on a given segment, virtual income can be obtained by 
extending the segment of the budget constraint to the right: the vertical 
intercept of this line at zero hours of work is the virtual income. In other 
words, the virtual income is a measure of the earnings of an individual could 
  7 in theory enjoy without working, observing her real budget constraint.
3 With 
this characterization, based on early works on taxes and labour supply (for 
instance Hall, 1973), we represent a consumer as facing a linear budget 
constraint in the presence of a non linear tax program. 
The indirect utility function that represents preferences is 







+ − + = w E e E w v
w  (6) 
where α, β are parameters, γ is a parameter linear function of personal 
characteristics and ε is a random variable. In the hypothesis of no taxes, and 
then of linear budget constraint, the desired labour supply function is 
ε β α γ + + + = E W E w H ) , (
*  (7) 
But the same equation holds also taking into account the non linearity of 
budget constraint caused by the tax system, replacing gross wage and non-
labour income with the relative net wage and virtual income: 
ε η β α γ + Ψ + + − + = V t W E w H ) 1 ( ) , (
*  (8) 
where V is the virtual income. The parameter η takes into account personal 
and demographic characteristics (Ψ ). It is assumed that ε has a mean zero 
normal distribution in the population. 
The wage coefficient and the income coefficient (α and β) being 
respectively non-negative and non-positive are sufficient conditions for the 
compensated labour supply wage elasticity to be non negative. 
                                                 
3 The third term in the virtual income equation represents the difference between the taxes that an 
individual on segment n would pay if she faced a proportional tax with rate tn and the taxes she 
actually pays, that is R(In). 
  8 We assume that observed hours worked are equal to desired hours of work, 
using a censored sample in which the zero hours observation were included.
4 
This choice however is problematic since no wage data were available for 
those reporting zero hours of work. Moreover, we have no information on 
whether individuals leave labour force due to search costs or whether are 
simply discouraged from looking for work expecting their probability of 
finding a job very small.
5 Heckit technique (Heckman, 1979) was used to 
correct a possible selection bias as a result of observing only wage rates of 
those gainfully employed.  
In the first step we estimate a probit equation on the whole sample that 
yields the probability of employment with respect to personal and labour 
market characteristics 
i i i i Z empl P µ δ ω + + =
' ] [  (9) 
The realization of P determines whether the individual is employed ( ) 
or unemployed or out of the labour force (
1 = i P
0 = i P ). It depends on the vector 
Z’ of personal characteristics. Z’ includes data about the non labour income, 
age and its squared, regional unemployment rate by gender, years of 
                                                 
4 Some papers assume that observed hours of work are equal to desired hours of work plus an additive 
stochastic term of error representing either sample measurement error or the failure of the worker to 
find a job requiring hours exactly equal to the desired quantity. See for instance Triest (1990). 
5 Duncan (1993) takes into account discouraged workers by estimating a labour supply equation in 
which he models the desire to enter in the labour force and the employment probability separately 
from the hours of work decision. This option cannot be followed in this paper because the dataset 
does not identify discouraged workers. 
  9 education and presence of children under 6. 
From the probit equation it is possible to create the inverse Mills ratio (or 
non-selection hazard ratio), used to purge the selection bias derived from the 
presence in the sample of both workers and non workers.  




i Z δ Φ
'
i Z δ
1 = i P  with probability   (10)  ) (
'
i Z δ Φ
0 = i P  with probability 1  (11)  ) (
'
i Z δ Φ −
The related normal density function is denoted . Having estimated 
the probit model, an estimate of the non-selection hazard,  , for a working 
individual i is obtained computing: 
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In other words, the non-selection hazard gives a measure of the probability 
of the i-th individuals of being included in the sample of the working 
population.  
In the second step, we estimate the wage equation in the sample of working 
population, including in the estimate the predicted value , avoiding the 
problem of selection bias: 
i λ ˆ
i i i i i K wage ε ρλ β α + + + =
'  (13) 
where K’ is a vector of control variables quite standard that includes age, 
age squared, years of education and binary variables concerning 
geographical residence, working categories and the activity sectors.  
  10 By imputing the expected value for the yearly labour income in the labour 
supply model to each observation of the working sample we avoid 
endogenity caused by the partial dependency of yearly wage on the numbers 
of hours worked. 
In estimating equation (8), an alternative to the use of a censored sample 
and Heckit technique can consist in using Tobit model, but a problem of this 
approach is that it does not separate out the individual effect of what 
determines individuals’ likelihood of finding in employment and what 
determines the hours of work decisions. Tobit model , although used in 
other research (for instance Heckman and MaCurdy, 1982; Jakubson, 1988) 
is mispecified when the limit observations (zero hours worked) are the result 
of personal decisions rather than an exogenous mechanism such as how the 
data were collected (Maddala, 1988). 
However, we estimate labour supply by using both Tobit and sample 
selection technique. 
3. Data 
We estimate labour force participation using data from the Survey of 
Households’ Income and Wealth (SHIW), provided by the research division 
of the Bank of Italy. Data are referred to year 2002. 
The database collects information on personal data, geographical 
characteristics, source of income, savings, consumptions, investments and 
labour activities from 8,011 households drawn from the lists of 344 towns. 
The sample is composed of 21,144 individuals and 13,536 of them receive 
an income (Bank of Italy, 2004). 
  11 In order to build a sample useful for a labour supply analysis, we selected 
individuals aged between 19 and 60 from the database. We drop people 
under military/civil service as invalids and people retired during the 
observed year.  
The questionnaire does not provide the number of hours worked during the 
overall year, but only the number of hours worked per week and the number 
of months worked. To solve this problem we built a proxy for the overall 
number of hours worked assuming arbitrarily 45 weeks are worked per year 
(3.75 per month). We therefore drop temporary workers not able to indicate 
the number of months worked.  
The final sample comprises 11,719 individuals. Table 1 shows the main 
characteristics of the sample. Figures from 1 to 8 in Appendix B show 
histograms of the frequency distributions of wages and hours worked by 
category. 
We estimate the elasticity of interest by splitting the sample into four 
different groups according to different gender behaviour on labour market: 
married women (3,927 observations, 1,723 employed), married men (3,360 
observations, 2,752 employed), unmarried women (2,045 and 1,057) and 
unmarried men (2,387 and 1,385)
6. The last two categories include people 
living on their own and all individuals living in a household as sons, 
daughters or other members or relatives, but not as spouses. Summary 
                                                 
6 The categories of “married” included both spouses and partners, without distinguishing between the 
legal status of the two form of household. 
  12 statistics show that the two unmarried categories includes younger, better 
educated people with lower wages. 
Since the questionnaire did not provide data about the hourly wage of the 
workers, we used yearly net labour income. Two reasons led to this choice. 
The former is that it is difficult to compute an hourly wage for people who 
do different jobs over the year or at the same time. The latter is that in Italy 
employees usually negotiate a national contract valid for homogeneous 
categories of jobs, where the wage is determined on monthly basis and not 
only exclusively on the number of hours worked.  
In the regressions, instead of using binary variables for the different levels 
of education, we give to each level a number corresponding to the duration 
of the course
7 and adding the numbers so that the education level is shown 








                                                 
7 We use the following number of years: no education: 0; elementary school: 5; middle school: 3; 
professional school diploma: 3; high school: 5; short university course degree: 3; bachelor’s degree: 
4; postgraduate qualification: 3. 
  13 Table 1. Main characteristics of the sample 
   Married 
women 




              
whole sample (#)  3,927  3,360  2,045  2,387 
age  (mean)  44.78 46.37 31.49 29.98 
        
age composition (%)         
age  19-40  33.46 26.64 79.51 86.13 
age 41-50  35.55  36.04  11.10  8.34 
age 51-60  30.99  37.32  9.49  5.53 
        
Activity (%)         
dependent  workers 36.92 62.65 46.16 48.09 
independent  workers  8.03 22.11 5.48 10.85 
other  55.05 15.24 48.32 41.06 
        
Education level (%)         
none  1.74 1.37 0.44 0.75 
elementary school  21.11  15.65  4.45  4.48 
middle  school  34.40 37.23 22.59 30.83 
professional school (3 y.)  6.34  7.65  6.75  7.91 
high  school  27.76 28.66 52.67 46.04 
short course univ. degree  0.87  0.63  1.17  0.96 
bachelor’s degree  7.74  8.57  11.64  8.92 
postgraduate  qualification  0.05 0.24 0.29 0.08 
        
 Residence**(%)         
north  44.05 44.26 40.59 42.94 
centre  19.84 19.79 21.03 21.24 
south  36.11 35.95 38.39 35.82 
        
worker sample (#)  1,723  2,752  1,057  1,385 
        
 Incomes and hours (year)         
mean net wage   13,035.62  18,594.12  12,684.23  13,432.51 
mean other income   3,075.16  6,674.03  2,708.33  1,730.77 
mean worked hours   1,495  1,825  1,596  1,737 
**: Regions in the South are Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, 
Sardegna. The regions in “Centre” are Toscana, Marche, Umbria, Lazio and Abruzzo. The 
regions in the North are Liguria, Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Veneto, Trentino – 





  14 4.  The tax system 
In 2002, personal income tax in Italy (IRPEF) consisted of 5 legal tax 
brackets associated with a piecewise decreasing deduction from gross 
income. This exemption is computed on the following piecewise equations 
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Moreover, a further deduction is structured as follows: 
Table 2. Further deductions on labour income in 2002 
Independent worker  Dependent worker 
Income bracket  Deduction  Income bracket  Deduction 
< 27,000  0  < 25,000  0 
27,000-29,500 130 25,000-29,400  80 
29,501 - 36,500  235  29,401 - 31,000  126 
36,501 – 41,500  180  31,000 – 32,000  80 
41,501 – 46,700  130  > 32,000  0 
46,701 – 52,000  25     
> 52,000  0     
 
The joint action of legal tax rates and deductions provide the implicit tax 
rates in Table 4. It is noticeable that the fifth bracket presents a tax rate 
larger than the sixth, for dependent workers, and that the fourth bracket 
presents a tax rate larger than the fifth, in the case of independent workers. 
This is a distortion to the progressivity of the system due to the 2002 tax 
reform and induces non-convexity of the budget sets. For a deeper analysis 
  15 of personal income tax reforms in Italy in the period 2002-2005 see Mancini 
and Tondani (2006).  
Table 3. Implicit tax rate on labour income in 2002 
Independent worker  Dependent worker 
Tax bracket  Tax rate  Freq. distr.  Tax bracket  Tax rate  Freq. distr. 
0 - 7,500  0  13.03  0 - 4,500  0  12.29 
7,501 - 19,100  29.63  58.87  4,501 – 17,200  26.98  31.08 
19,101 – 30,000  37.37  19.09  17,201-29,200  34.02  27.97 
30,001 – 32,900  39.94  1.61  29,201-30,500  36.37  1.30 
32,901 – 33,500  50.25  0.24  30,501-32,600  31.00  1.99 
33,501 – 70,000  39.00  6.32  32,601 – 70,000 39.00  20.52 
> 70,000  45.00  0.83  > 70,000  45.00  4.85 
 
Family tax exemptions for dependent family members are structured as in 
table 4. 
Table 4. Tax deductions for parent in charge 
Dependent wife or husband 
Tax brackets  Deduction 
0 - 15,493.71  546,18 
15,493.72 - 30,987.41  496,6 
30,987.42 - 51,645.69  459,42 
>51,645.69 422,23 
Dependent children 
Tax brackets  Deduction 
 1
st child  2





0 - 36,151.98  516.46  516.46  516.46  516.46 
36,151.99 - 41,316.55  303.68  516.46  516.46  516.46 
41,316.56 - 46,481.12  303.68  336.73  516.46  516.46 
46,481.13 - 51,645.69  285.08  285.08  285.08  516.46 
>  51,645.69  0 0 0 0 
      
If the taxpayer has dependent spouse tax exemption for children is completely 
attributed to him; otherwise the exemption is attributed to both spouses at 50 per 
cent per capita 
 
Since Bank of Italy’s dataset provides only net income, we moved 
backwards in order to get a proxy of gross labour incomes and then compute 
the virtual income. We subtract the exemption attributable to each worker 
from him net labour income. From that post-tax income we compute the 
  16 gross income using the inverse tax code. 
The gross labour income this obtained is only a proxy of this measure 
because Italian law on personal income taxation allows tax exemption of 
percentage of expenditure on goods or services such as medical, school or 
insurance, interests on debt for house purchase, etc. These expenditures are 
not reported in the database but we consider gross labour income is a close 
enough approximation of reality.  
However, other problems regarding the truthfulness of the data arise from 
the fact that incomes in the database are declared personally by the head of 
the household. Several studies on previous SHIW waves analysed this 
problem. Cannari and Violi (1991) estimate that tax evasion lowers 
aggregate income by 20 per cent. Cannari and Gavosto (1995) argue that is 
hard to correct the underestimate of a second income and the overestimate 
of the hours worked. These problems are caused by the individual’s 
reticence in declaring sensitive data rather than by measuring error, but also 
by forgetting to declare occasional jobs or calculating holydays and leave.  
So, although the SHIW database can be considered the most reliable 
representation of Italian households income and wealth, it may reflect 
inaccurate figures. 
5. Results 
The results of the Tobit model are shown in Table 5. The elasticities 
reported are valid only for local movement along a given budget segment.  
Married men and married women follow the pattern shown by other 
researches: in the married population, female labour supply is more reactive 
  17 than that of males to an increase in net wage. Unmarried men are more 
reactive than married men to increase in net wage, while the inverse pattern 
is observed for women. Income effect is negative and significant in all cases 
and it is larger for men. 
Dummy variables provide other information about labour supply. To be a 
student negatively affects the number of hours worked, in the unmarried 
categories. To be divorced decreases labour supply but the coefficient is 
significant only for men. Presence of children under 6 has negative sign, as 
expected. Finally, dependent workers present a labour supply smaller than 
the independents. 
Table 5. Tobit estimation of hours worked 
hours worked  Married 
women 




      
net labour income  0.020  0.008  0.011  0.017 
  (0.003)** (0.001)** (0.003)** (0.003)** 
virtual  income -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)*  (0.001)** 
child under 6  -84.525    -252.417   
  (30.154)**  (126.743)*  
dependent  worker -250.920 -228.484 -160.350 -202.578 
  (34.320)** (19.311)** (47.921)** (37.014)** 
student     -936.328  -1,227.388 
     (124.890)**  (162.623)** 
divorced    -58.922  -98.911 
     (37.933)  (45.482)* 
Constant  1,573.346 1,884.485 1,664.665 1,750.927 
  (58.828)** (31.350)** (70.691)** (71.225)** 
Standard  error  479.478 389.838 432.904 422.840 
  (8.168)** (5.255)** (9.415)** (8.034)** 
      
Log likelihood  -13,080.391  -20,322.612  -7,916.353  -10,340.315 
Observations 3927 3360 2045 2387 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Since Tobit estimation does not separate out the individuals’ probability of 
being employed and the determinants of hours of work decisions, a second 
  18 estimates is made using sample selection approach (Table 6). 
Wage and income coefficients are smaller than in the Tobit model. The 
presence of children under 6 affect negatively and significantly labour 
supply for both married and unmarried women. 
Table 6. Censored sample estimation of hours worked 
hours worked  Married 
women 




      
net labour income  0.026  0.008  0.009  0.013 
 (0.004)**  (0.001)**  (0.004)*  (0.004)** 
virtual  income -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)*  (0.001)* 
child under 6  -98.653    -238.441   
 (30.954)**    (153.633)   
dependent  worker -224.768 -231.351 -168.170 -219.920 
  (41.980)** (22.612)** (62.322)** (41.090)** 
student     -815.735  -939.517 
     (160.363)**  (164.204)** 
divorced    -60.344  -88.220 
     (38.938)  (50.200) 
inverse Mills ratio  87.368  -40.161  -66.342  -153.095 
 (42.253)*  (41.529)  (61.440)  (50.501)** 
Constant  1,443.310 1,901.262 1,731.578 1,874.575 
 (86.407)**  (38.172)**  (108.996)**  (91.586)** 
Observations 1723 2752 1057 1385 
R-squared  0.0902 0.0988 0.1063 0.1356 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 








Tobit (latent variable) 
 Uncompensated wage elasticity  0.203 0.008 0.011 0,017 
Income elasticity  -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
Compensated wage elasticity  0.206 0.011 0.013 0.020 
Sample selection approach 
 Uncompensated wage elasticity  0.225 0.084 0.069 0.097 
Income elasticity  -0.092 -0.021 -0.024 -0.027 
Compensated wage elasticity  0.317 0.105 0.093 0.124 
 
Table 7 shows uncompensated wage elasticity and income elasticity 
evaluated at the mean of hours worked. For Tobit model elasticities are 
  19 conditional on positive hours worked and on the whole sample 
(unconditional to the censor value). 
Negative income elasticities indicate that leisure is a normal good; that is, an 
increase in income leads to an increase in the consumption of leisure (or a 
decrease of hours worked). 
6. Concluding  remarks 
In this paper we attempted to estimate the effect of taxes on labour supply 
for four categories of Italian workers: married men, married women, 
unmarried men, unmarried women. Using both Tobit technique and sample 
selection approach we find that in the married population, female labour 
supply is more reactive than males to an increase in net wage. The positive 
relationship between the wage rate and the hours of work decision suggests 
that cuts in income taxes, generating higher after tax wages, would offer an 
incentive to increase hours of work, even if personal and household 
characteristics are important in labour supply decision, especially for 
women. Negative income elasticities indicate that leisure is considered a 
normal good.  Most of these results are consistent with the findings of other 
research. Nevertheless, two factors affect the coefficients. The first is the 
non convexity of the budget sets caused by the exemption introduced in the 
computation of personal income tax. The second is the assumption here 
adopted of considering hours worked declared equal to hours worked 
desired. The non specification of the measurement error in the hours worked 
could lead to some error in the coefficient.  
Hence, this investigation left open the possibility of an improvement of the 
  20 research in further papers. 
Appendix A 
Following the econometric methodology explained in section 2 we estimate 
the probability of being employed. Probit estimates are shown in table 7. All 
the variables show the expected sign. If not, the coefficient is not 
significant. In particular, we observe a very small decrease in probability of 
being employed due to the sum of the household incomes (excluded the 
wage earned by the individual): a 100,000 euro increase of unearned income 
produces a decrease in probability of being employed that varies from –
0.023 for married men to –0.078 for married and unmarried women. As 
expected, male probability of being employed decreases less than that of 
women.  
Age and its squared depict an expected and well-known shape of 
probability: in all four cases, probability of being employed increases with 
age then decreases. Regressing employment status on age and age squared 
only, we get that the slope of the probability changes at 38.9 years for 
married women, 39.8 for married men, 42.4 for unmarried women, 41.1 for 
unmarried men. 
The regional unemployment rate, differentiated for males and females, 
lowers the probability of employment from –0.035 to –0.094 per cent. 
Years of education increase the probability in three cases out of four, with 
coefficients included in the range 0.009 – 0.126, and the coefficient is 
significant in three cases out of four. Women’s probability is also affected 
by the presence of children. In the case of unmarried individuals, being a 
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Table A.1. Probit estimates of employment 
employed Married 
women 




      
other incomes earned 
by household (x 
100,000) 
-0.072 -0.023 0.043  -0.068 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)  (0.000)** 
child under 6  -0.226    -0.542   
 (0.066)**    (0.274)*   
age  0.172 0.303 0.130 0.167 
  (0.024)** (0.032)** (0.024)** (0.022)** 
age squared  -0.002  -0.004  -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
unemployment rate  -0.035  -0.046  -0.049  -0.094 
  (0.002)** (0.006)** (0.003)** (0.006)** 
years of education  0.126  0.094  0.049  0.011 
  (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.011)** (0.010) 
family size  -0.061  0.158  -0.129  -0.039 
 (0.024)*  (0.032)**  (0.032)**  (0.031) 
student    -2.318  -2.750 
    (0.143)**  (0.168)** 
Constant -3.654  -5.257  -1.324  -1.302 
  (0.485)** (0.676)** (0.455)** (0.413)** 
      
Log pseudo-likelihood   -2,213.4817   -1,177.0245  -889.7178  -1,012.3977 
Observations  3,927 3,360 2,045 2,387 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The Mills ratio produced by this regression was used in estimating wage 
equations (table 8). Inverse Mills ratio is positive and significant in the cases 
of married women and men. This indicates that there are unobserved 
variables increasing the probability of selection and the probability of a 
higher than average score on the log of the wage. On the other hand, inverse 




  22 Table A.2. Wage equations 
wage Married 
women 




      
age  742.798 1,050.421 189.547  491.165 
  (236.432)**  (327.740)** (234.829) (162.106)** 
age squared  -8.202  -11.580  0.178  -4.312 
 (2.912)**  (4.033)**  (3.226)  (2.262) 
years  of  education  785.897 490.067 521.550 144.225 
  (143.983)** (90.101)** (201.540)**  (73.052)* 
      
Residence. Reference: Regions of the North 
centre  -1,100.481 -1,867.422 -1,043.782  -245.808 
 (509.351)*  (531.207)**  (851.233)  (455.296) 
south  -3,304.191 -3,839.517 -1,848.952 -1,361.099 
  (791.858)** (461.522)** (698.060)**  (771.680) 
      
Kind of employment. Reference: blue-collar worker or similar (including apprentices and home 
workers) 
office  worker  1,928.140  2,155.678 518.018 1,899.870 
  (416.650)** (439.564)** (1,335.692) (446.424)** 
school teacher (in any type of 
school) 
2,038.374 929.831  -866.461 2,682.036 
 (658.371)**  (986.040)  (1,749.386)  (1,662.047) 
junior  manager/cadre  5,673.760 7,780.987 3,474.501 5,660.794 
 (1,212.299)**  (928.676)**  (2,097.306)  (1,228.259)** 
manager, senior official, 
principal, headmaster, 
university teacher, magistrate 
15,258.862 20,174.802 12,187.350 19,277.535 
 (4,013.742)**  (2,012.623)**  (4,120.306)** (4,036.112)** 
member of the arts or 
professions 
8,387.943 12,639.982  10,578.311 7,739.173 
 (1,841.393)**  (2,690.667)**  (4,073.755)** (1,629.832)** 
sole  proprietor  5,328.249 13,892.598 8,759.306 11,383.876 
 (1,608.450)**  (2,949.735)**  (3,918.272)*  (4,876.880)* 
free  lance  3,880.711 5,485.094 1,293.686 5,093.440 
 (1,573.804)*  (706.794)**  (1,622.033)  (1,134.841)** 
owner or member of a family 
business 
7,073.532  4,897.463  5,127.726 
 (1,648.624)**  (1,729.114)**    (3,377.469) 
active  shareholder/partner 4,202.996  8,749.114 269.138 8,129.682 
 (2,164.488)  (8,816.991)  (908.169)  (2,396.035)** 
      
Branch of activity of the company in which the member works. Reference: agriculture, hunting, 
forestry, fishing, fish-farming and related services. 
manufactures  4,323.054 3,466.231 2,932.813 3,206.664 
 (989.190)**  (830.015)**  (1,010.932)**  (858.294)** 
building and construction  2,520.742 2,521.932 2,745.176 2,675.024 
  (2,558.668) (951.588)** (2,205.676) (956.821)** 
wholesale and retail trade  1,944.189  844.148  2,262.119  2,995.129 
 (1,123.325)  (922.935)  (995.522)*  (1,009.353)** 
transport, warehouse and 
storage and communication 
services 
2,614.269 3,817.789 3,264.321 3,442.184 
  (1,407.421) (977.720)** (1,694.879)  (1,087.005)** 
  23 real estate and renting services, 
IT services, research 
1,570.782 2,301.467 3,688.114 2,065.003 
  (1,235.406) (1,632.712) (2,608.838) (1,369.550) 
domestic services provided to 
households and other private 
services 
844.827 940.440 183.984  1,077.299 
  (962.780)  (1,427.120) (1,020.889) (1,384.143) 
general government, defence, 
education, health and other 
public services 
3,348.713 2,231.234 2,641.801 2,384.505 
 (960.874)**  (895.657)*  (1,018.417)**  (952.469)* 
extraterritorial organizations 
and entities 
6,195.639 5,764.831    -276.534 
  (3,135.469)*  (4,405.506)  (2,297.750) 
services of credit and insurance 
institutions 
4,586.671 11,341.410 6,521.211  5,030.569 
 (1,401.591)**  (3,378.641)**  (3,355.120) (1,571.861)** 
Mills 5,105.836  5,978.343  -2,712.574  -600.761 
 (1,534.691)**  (1,982.249)**  (1,203.971)*  (1,102.491) 
Constant -19,727.565  -15,598.887  -1,834.495  -3,092.275 
 (6,654.247)**  (7,006.027)*  (4,340.625)  (3,162.614) 
      
Observations  1723 2752 1057 1385 
R-squared  0.2255 0.2698 0.1953 0.2694 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Figure 2 -  Frequency distribution of wage by married men
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Figure 4 - Frequency distribution of wage by unmarried men
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Figure 6 - Frequency distribution of hours worked by married men
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